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Abstract 
The revolutionary process in Egypt since 2011 has not only mobilized masses in 
Egypt, but has also led to a massive politicization and polarization of Egyptian 
communities abroad. Women from different generations became active in the 
protests claiming their agency to participate in changing their country. 
Cyberactivism became a particularly important vehicle for women to participate 
politically in the revolutionary process. This paper looks at transnational political 
networks in Paris working to influence politics in Egypt in the (post)-revolutionary 
phase between 2011 and 2013 with a special focus on women. An analysis of 30 
informative-narrative interviews and several popular Facebook pages of diaspora 
networks reveals how women participated alongside men in transnational 
mobilizations in Paris, and how they experienced and lived these moments as they 
took part in their struggle. Several factors shape the political participation of women 
in this diasporic context, the gendered character of Egyptian migration to France 
itself, an inner fragmentation and politicization among women and finally, women’s 
broader understanding of politics blurring the traditional boundary of public and 
private. Contrary to assimilation theory, most participating women are not 
marginalized or poorly educated immigrants, but are on the contrary well educated 
and socially well connected.  
INTRODUCTION 
The revolutionary process in Egypt since 2011 has not only mobilized 
masses in Egypt, but has also led to a massive politicization and polarization 
of Egyptian communities abroad.  
During the Arab Spring, the question on how Arab diasporas were 
involved in the uprisings was highly debated, especially in media, but little 
serious academic research exists so far, including the Egyptian diaspora.1 
Even less is known on the extent to which Egyptian women in the diaspora 
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participated politically in the (post)revolutionary process and, more 
specifically, how cyberspace was used to foster Arab women’s transnational 
activism. Thus, the purpose of this article is to analyze the role women played 
in Egyptian transnational political networks in Paris in the (post-
)revolutionary process, how cyber activism was, and continues to be, used by 
them and what challenges female activists face.  
The revolution in Egypt heavily affected the migratory outcomes within 
the region and internationally. Following the uprising in 2011 and Egypt’s 
unclear foreign policy, there has been a change in labor laws in some Arab 
countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, resulting in a slowdown of new 
contracts and work permits for potential migrants, opening up other 
migration options, such as – mostly irregular – migration to Europe. As a 
result of the crisis, many European countries reacted by either lowering the 
quota for migrants or making the procedures for legal migration more 
difficult.2 The impact of the revolutions in the Middle East on the volume of 
remittances to Egypt is still unknown. However, the suspicion is of a slight 
decline in remittances due to the repatriation of Egyptian migrants from 
areas of unrest, especially Libya.3 However, the uprisings did not only affect 
remittances and migration policies, but also lead to a more intense interest in 
Egypt and a renewed feeling of patriotism among Egyptians living abroad. 
Even if the revolution has to date achieved very few of its political aims, it has 
achieved one major aim in giving Egyptians back a sense of belonging and a 
will and ability of participating in affairs of public interest4 which was 
perpetuated also in its communities abroad. Several proposals were made by 
the Egyptian diaspora to support the Egyptian economy, such as the Tahrir 
Square Foundation seeking to use the resources of the overseas Egyptians to 
assist in problems at home.5 Other proposals included the idea to use the 
savings of individual Egyptians abroad to start projects in Egypt or even to 
return to Egypt in order to invest with knowledge, expertise and savings in 
the development of the country.6 
During the upheaval of the immediate Arab Spring revolution in January 
and February 2011, women became very present as political activists in the 
public sphere and on graffiti – targeting sexual harassment of women, 
particularly during political protests – often in stark contrast to the persistent 
perception in the West of Muslim women as oppressed victims who have 
little agency. As protests grew, women from different generations and socio-
economical background became highly active in the on-going anti-regime 
protests claiming their agency to participate in changing the country. 7 
Accounts on how women and men mixed in public places seemed to 
temporarily have suspended traditional gender roles leading to expectations 
how women would continue to shape their country’s destiny after the 
upheavals. Especially cyber activism has been an important vehicle for 
women to participate politically in the revolutionary process in the Arab 
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countries. Prominent examples were Lina Ben Mhenni, a Tunisian female 
blogger who tweeted and reported on Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation 
or Asmaa Mahfouz who called out to women and men in January 2011 to 
participate in the January 25 demonstrations by uploading videos on social 
networks. However, Arab women’s use of cyberspace and social media 
outlets as a means for activism far predates the Arab Spring, due to the fact 
that the internet can be safely and anonymously used from women’s homes. 
As Rita Stephan has shown, Arab women have been using the cyberspace to 
organize collectively since the 1990s. In fact, the internet is among the few 
spaces outside mainstream politics that are accessible to minorities and 
women’s activism. 8  Stephan argues that the nature of cyberspace is 
particularly suitable and familiar to women’s activism, because “its lack of 
institutional and cultural norms is similar to the nontraditional spaces that the 
women’s movement has created since its beginning”.9 However, cyberspace is 
in itself a contested space for power struggles and has become a domain 
where gender relations take place.10   
This article gives an insight into how women participated in the Arab 
Spring uprisings by analyzing transnational mobilizations in Paris. First, I 
discuss how the revolution in 2011 lead to an increased transnational political 
participation in Paris which included women. Second, I move to an analysis 
of cyber activism of transnational political networks in Paris. Finally, I 
analyze challenges for the political participation of women in a diasporic 
context. 
METHODOLOGY 
This paper is based on data I collected in Paris between September and 
December 2013. During this field research, I followed transnational political 
networks in Paris trying to influence politics in Egypt in the (post)-
revolutionary phase between 2011 and 2013. Ostergaard-Nielsen defines 
transnational political networks as “transnational political practices, their 
links and organizations engaging in political processes in their country of 
origin”.11 The networks I studied varied in orientation, size and organization 
structure, some were openly political, such as the Association of Young 
Egyptians of the 25th of January Paris, the Association of Young Egyptians of 
the 25th of January France, Voices of Egypt, the 6th of April Movement France, 
the French Tamarrud Campaign, the Collective for the Defense of Democracy 
in Egypt, the Women Movement against the Coup d’Etat, and some had no 
open political agenda, but served as forums for political discussion on a 
second degree, such as the Coptic Solidarity, Blogcopte, France-Egypt Club 
and the Franco-Egyptian Organization for Human Rights.  
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Methodologically, I studied these networks on two different levels. On 
the one hand, I conducted around 30 informative-narrative interviews12 with 
people active in transnational political networks, so-called “transnational 
activists.” Sidney Tarrow has defined transnational activists as: 
individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and 
international resources and opportunities to advance claims 
on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in 
favor of goals they hold in common with transnational allies.  
I decided not to choose a specific age segment or limit the interviewees to the 
first, second or third generation, but tried to reach a maximal scope of age 
and generation to get a broad impression of participation. My aim was to 
interview the most active people in these transnational political networks. 
Thus, I did not aim to reach an equal gender balance, but interview the most 
active people in these networks. I used the snowball technique with different 
entry points to avoid getting a biased picture. In total, I conducted 25 
interviews with men and six with women.  
Secondly, I undertook an analysis of the cyber activism of these networks. 
In my case, research on networks on Facebook was particularly promising, as 
Facebook was the central tool for mobilization and organization of these 
networks. From a methodological perspective on social networks, the web is 
social and informational – it is about what holds the network together and 
what is discussed in it.13 I first conducted a content analysis of these networks 
on Facebook to study its content. I followed-up networks’ profiles on 
Facebook, translated their content and discussions and then analyzed them 
on the basis of the following questions: 
• How active, how popular is the page?
• How are postings and comments written (German, Modern
Standard Arabic, Egyptian dialect)?
• Who writes? Who comments?
• What kind of links is posted? How is the page connected to
other websites and Facebook groups?
• What subjects and themes are mainly written about?
To study the social character of these networks, I used a digital methods 
approach.14 Networks as such are hybrid objects formed by social actors and 
the links between them. Not new as such – applications exist since Jacob 
Moreno’s sociograms in 1934 – this concept has known a revival in the last 
years, due to the development of a series of mathematic techniques making 
the analysis of complex digital networks possible, as well as the increasing 
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availability of software to analyze and visualize graphs. Software programs 
such as Gephi can make these networks visible as graphs, emphasizing their 
primary elements. Actors are visualized as nodes, while links between actors 
are shown as edges, thus creating graphic maps. These visualizations make it 
possible to read networks like maps. The most connected actors can be seen 
with one click, their links, the numbers of actors in a network, as well as 
clusters of interconnected actors. I used the application Netvizz developed in 
2009 by Bernhard Rieder from Amsterdam University to extract Facebook 
profiles and pages of political networks I studied. I then used the software 
program Gephi to visualise these networks. In my analysis, I hid users’ 
Facebook names in order to keep their anonymity in spite of the majority of 
users not trying to remain anonymous.  
WOMEN ACTIVISTS IN TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL 
NETWORKS IN PARIS 
A new sense of collectivity including women 
In Paris, the reconfigurations and political mobilizations that have taken 
place since January 2011 reflect the political events in Egypt. What can be 
observed are strong dynamics from Egypt influencing Egyptian social fields 
abroad, on a political, but also on a very personal level. Generally, the 
uprising in January 2011 served as a moment of renewed patriotism and an 
increased interest in Egyptian politics and society. Most of my interviewees 
described these first months as a time during which they mentally and 
psychologically lived in Egypt, even if they were physically in France. Thus, 
the events had a double effect. On the one hand, the political events since 
2011 lead to an increased political mobilization among Egyptians abroad. On 
the other hand, they lead to a feeling of reunion with other Egyptians living 
in Paris, the demonstrations in Paris in January 2011 serving as a major space 
of mutual discovery. 
A participant described this politicization as follows: 
We did not really know each other before. (...) It was only 
from the 25th of January onwards that I started to look left and 
right to see what was happening, what the different belongings 
of Egyptians in France were. It was a factor of reunion. All 
these communities became involved in what happened in 
Egypt, in one way or the other. All, the Muslim Brothers, the 
Salafis, the Liberals, they all got involved. Suddenly, there was 
this conscience that we could not just let things happen in 
Egypt like that.
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Another respondent especially stressed the role of the 18 days in January 
2011 as a moment of mutual discovery, a moment that was perceived as a 
deeply collective experience. The interviewee’s response makes it clear that 
these moments were lived and perceived as a time where the “we” became 
more important than the “I”.  
I was all the time on the telephone or the internet. I remember, 
when I came back to Paris from a study trip, and I changed my 
mobile chip, I received a text message that there was a 
demonstration in front of the Egyptian consulate in Paris. I 
didn’t even change my clothes, but took my jacket and went to 
the Egyptian consulate... It started like this. I was all the time 
on Twitter, another person was on al-Jazeera, one on France 
24, another one on BBC Arabic. There were [sic] news all the 
time, and you met people you didn’t even know they existed. 
During the 18 days, we hardly ate, we hardly slept. One 
moment, we laughed, one moment we thought it would work, 
one moment it won’t. 
This new feeling of collectivity is also emphasized in the following 
statement by one of the organizers of the Tamarrud campaign in Paris. She 
especially mentions the fact that even people who had never been involved in 
Egyptian community life in Paris before got in contact with each other and 
experienced a feeling of belonging together:  
The revolution led to a feeling of closeness among Egyptians, 
not only in Egypt, but also here. The majority of people who 
have been here since ten or fifteen years and did not know any 
Egyptians, people who said that they never spent time with 
Egyptians – even people who said “stay away from Egyptians, 
they are annoying and too curious”. It was really strange. With 
the 25th of January, all Egyptians started to know each other. 
There were people who have been in France for 15 years and 
they never met an Egyptian. Today, it’s really a friendship, it 
changed. I really have the feeling that it brought people 
together, it’s crazy. 
Social movement scholars emphasize the significance of social context 
and physical space in the construction of collective identity. They agree that 
the collectivization of identity is an essential part of activism.15 As Rita 
Stephan pointed out, one essential question in this respect is how individual 
members identify themselves.16 Most of the female activists I interviewed 
emphasized that women were part of this new sense of collectivity and were 
important and active actors in the political struggle going on. One activist 
explains this phenomenon as follows:  
Transnational Politics, Women & The Egyptian Revolution 35 
I think the mobilization of women in the revolution is similar 
to other contexts. I believe that women are in general more 
active, but they are not necessarily looking for recognition. 
They are not as visible, but that does not mean that they don’t 
participate and even participate more. Because on the ground, 
there are not only men and women are attacked more brutally 
than men. (…) We are not numerous, but we are very active.  
The revolution as a moment of renegotiating identity 
This experience of collectivity is closely linked to questions of identity 
and a search for belonging. I argue that in a diasporic context, revolutions 
and important political events in people’s country of origin can lead to a 
renegotiation of one’s identity. One very important finding of my interviews 
with activists in Paris was that the revolutionary processes challenged and 
altered the perception of their identity. My interview partners narrated these 
moments of political upheaval as a time where their identity was 
renegotiated; their relation to France and Western society, on the one hand, 
and to Egypt and the Middle East, on the other. Universally, all activists 
emphasized that the revolution made them feel more “Egyptian;” a concept 
that was seen during the revolution to comprise multiple meanings. Some 
activists described that the political events made them feel “Egyptian” even if 
they did not necessarily feel so before 2011. For instance, one respondent told 
me that before 2011, she neither felt at home in Sweden where she grew up, 
nor in Egypt, where one of her parents was from. She felt alien in Egypt and 
had the feeling that nobody in Egypt resembled her in her way of thinking. 
She had the feeling that she did not “fit in” in any of these two countries. 
However, with the revolution in 2011, this fact changed considerably: 
My mother told me... that we need the revolution more than 
the revolution needs us. I don’t know if this is true for people 
in Egypt, I can only talk about myself... Before the revolution, I 
felt... that I don’t fit. Sometimes, I didn’t want to go to Egypt 
because I didn’t fit... I was different. After the revolution, I can 
talk in poetic terms, it was like an open flower, you saw so 
many things in it, so many colours. Which we didn’t know. It 
took me some time to understand that I fit in and all people fit 
in because there is not only one way to be in Egypt, there are 
millions of ways to be in Egypt and they are all crazy (laughs) 
and it’s good that I am crazy. 
The realization of Egypt’s diversity helped her to accept her own 
multilayered identity. It made her want to take part in this social movement 
and simultaneously reassured the Egyptian side of her identity. The 
participation in the political protest in 2011 and afterwards thus served as a 
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rediscovery of her own identity and was a reason to identify with Egypt 
which was suddenly perceived as embracing different ways of thinking. The 
following comment by another activist underlines this feeling as well:  
I think that the revolution has helped me in the perception of 
myself. Today, the fight of one part of the Egyptian population 
is about the recognition of diversity. So, I do not have to adapt 
to a certain archetypical Egyptian model. No, we are different, 
and that’s something that we have to defend and this, in some 
way, comforted me.  
The revolution also allowed activists to “make peace” – in a certain way – 
with their Middle Eastern origin. One French-born young activist whose 
parents are both Egyptian talks in her interview about a feeling of pride which 
was given back to her through the revolution:   
There is a feeling of pride that was given back to us. When 
your country goes through a phase like that, it is very difficult 
afterwards to continue with the society you live in just as 
before. 
This sentiment was voiced by numerous other interviewees. They 
emphasized that the revolution gave them back a pride in their Egyptian 
origin, in a Middle East that had been for a long-time perceived as monolithic 
by Western public opinion and as democratically unable to change.  
As Odmalm argues, the question of identification and its potential 
importance for political participation has been hinted at in a number of 
academic texts, but has been rarely studied systematically. He introduces the 
concept of identification as the missing link between literature on migration 
and identity and migration and political participation.17 My data indicates 
that the Arab Spring revolution in 2011 served as a moment of renewed self-
identification with Egypt for Egyptians living abroad affecting their political 
behaviour deeply.  
Characteristics of female transnational activists in Paris 
Interestingly, female transnational activists in Paris share certain 
common characteristics, regardless of their political opinion. The majority of 
these women are well educated, well connected, speak several languages and 
lived in different countries. Most of them were already socially or politically 
engaged in some way or the other before the revolution. They are mostly 
professionally successful women. However, they differ in their age and their 
migration history. In regards to the socio-professional background of these 
activists, Mounira Charrad has already shown for Tunisian feminism that 
female activists are typically professional women working in academia, 
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medicine, law and journalism.18 This also seems to be true for female activists 
in the (post-)revolutionary process in Egypt.    
Hanna, a 37-year-old researcher, grew up in Egypt until she was 16 and 
studied in Sweden, Norway and the United States before coming to France to 
work. Before 2011, she participated politically for issues such as racism in 
Norway, the Palestinian question, the war in Iraq and anti-globalization 
protests. In 2011, she became part of the Association of the 25th of January 
Paris and later participated in the Collective Voices of Egypt.  
Marie-Ange was 28 years at the time of our interview and was born in 
Paris. She described herself as Franco-Egyptian and just finished her studies 
in European Studies. She sees her professional future in educational or 
cultural projects connecting the two shores of the Mediterranean. She 
described herself as a very mobile and independently thinking person who 
travelled through Egypt by herself. She helped to organize the Tamarrud 
campaign in Paris and is part of the Collective Voices of Egypt. 
Myra was born in 1955, holds a PhD in biophysics and is a clinical 
research consultant in Paris. She has been living in Paris for 27 years where 
she undertook some of her studies, but also lived in London for several years. 
She is active in two NGOs, France-Egypt, which organizes conferences on 
contemporary and ancient Egyptian culture and Mared, an association 
campaigning for secularism in Egypt.  
Shahinaz is somehow an exception to other interviewed female activists. 
Born in Alexandria in 1979, she lived in Egypt until 2010 and was already 
extremely politically active before 2011 as part of the Egyptian blogging scene 
and a member of Kifaya. She mainly blogs about  her concerns with the lack 
of freedom of expression in the Middle East. As an activist, she has 
volunteered in NGOs and other civil society organizations in Egypt to 
encourage the formation of coalitions among human rights organizations. 
She moved to France because of family pressures she experienced as a single 
and independent female activist living alone in Egypt.  In Paris, she is now 
working as an engineer for a French company and is one of the most visible 
faces in mobilizations in Paris. She has joined the Dustur party in 2012 and is 
campaigning for it in France.  
The last two female activists I interviewed represented another type of 
activists. They participated in demonstrations in favor of the return of 
Muhammad Morsy after the events in the summer of 2013. Like other female 
activists, both of them are well educated, very eloquent and have very precise 
ideas about their political claims. They have both grown up in France and 
emphasized Islam as an essential element of their identity. One of them, the 
18-year-old medical student Iman, was one of the main voices of the National 
Alliance to Support Democracy in Egypt (CODE) during demonstrations after 
July 2013. The 23-year-old student Ikram, who has no Egyptian origins, is an 
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activist in the pro-Palestinian Collective Cheikh Yassine, and participated as 
such in the “anti-coup” demonstrations. She defined herself as a Muslim 
activist and explains her participation in the CODE movement by the fact 
that the struggle going on in Egypt is similar to conflicts in other Muslim 
countries.  
My findings parallel already existing research that indicates that, contrary 
to the classic view of assimilation theory, transnational political activities are 
not the refuge of marginalized or poorly educated immigrants. On the 
contrary, transnational activists are usually better educated than most of their 
compatriots, better connected, speak more languages and travel more often.19 
Most of them do not begin their careers at the international level, but start 
engaging politically on the domestic level, and often return to their domestic 
activities after their transnational experience.  
A  FRAGMENTED AND GENDERED TRANSNATIONAL 
POLITICIZATION  
The revolutionary events since 2011 have not only made ideological 
differences visible and created political divisions in Egypt, but also among 
Egyptians living abroad. To a certain extent, political developments in Egypt 
have been mirrored in Paris. After a first rapprochement during the eighteen 
days of the revolution in 2011 and a phase of increased political and civic 
participation, organizations were founded that followed the logics of 
respective organizations in Egypt, sometimes even carrying the same names. 
The Association des Jeunes du 25 Janvier was founded in the aftermath of the 
revolution, wanting to represent the “revolutionary” Egyptian youth abroad 
aiming at continuing their activities after the depart of Mubarak on February 
11 2011. This group had internal conflicts and divided later into two separate 
associations: Association du 25 Janvier Paris and Association du 25 Janvier 
France. Later, the April 6 France Movement started, representing the April 6 
Movement in Egypt in France. Also the Tamarrud Campaign in Egypt had a 
counterpart in Paris, organized by different activists. Finally, after the 
overthrow of Morsy’s presidency in July 2013, similar to Egypt, a group 
emerged supporting the return of Mohammed Morsy to the political scene, 
the National Alliance to Support Democracy (at-Taḥāluf al-Waṭanī li-Daʿm 
ash-Sharʿiyya). Political divisions already became apparent after the 
presidential elections in 2012, but increased highly after June 30 2013 
polarizing Egyptian social fields into two main camps, the dividing line 
crystallized around the terms “inqilāb” (coup) and “ath-thawra ath-thāniya” 
(second revolution), thus around the question of how the events on July 3 
2013 should be interpreted.  
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In general, women were less visible than men in mobilizations in Paris, 
offline and online. Nevertheless, women activists do exist in Egyptian 
transnational political networks and those who do exist are very active. 
Especially, social media has become a space for women to participate in 
discussions and actions taking place in Paris. Research on female 
cyberactivism has shown that cyberspace has been used as an instrument for 
Arab women’s activism for over a decade to discover, gain and discuss 
information, find kindred spirits, chat and participate in debates. 20 
Hawthorne and Klein have defined cyberactivism as “the act of using the 
internet to advance a political cause that is difficult to advance offline... to 
create intellectually and emotionally compelling digital artefacts that tell 
stories of injustice, interpret history, and advocate for particular political 
outcomes’.21  
However, a series of challenges limit Arab women’s activism in 
cyberspace. Rita Stephan sees the low Internet penetration and internet 
restrictions in certain areas in the Middle East, combined with high female 
illiteracy rates and a patriarchal cultural discourse that inhibits women’s free 
access to the internet as the main limitations.22 This is exemplified by the fact 
that in the Middle East only a third of the Facebook users are female, while 
on a global level, half of all users are women.23 The outburst of the Arab 
Spring drew greater attention to women’s cyberactivism in countries such as 
Tunisia and Egypt where women turned to the Internet as a means of protest. 
In Egypt, during the revolution, both, men and women used the cyberspace 
to act as intermediaries between the world and mainstream media and 
delivered various eyewitness sources. The well-known activist Esraa Abdel 
Fattah known as the “Facebook girl” became famous for using Facebook to 
launch the April 6 movement.24  
How are these dynamics now reproduced in a migration context and 
Egyptian communities in Paris, in particular? In general, the expansion of 
social media in the Arab World has been a huge impetus for its communities 
abroad to follow social and political processes in their country of origin, 
without necessarily having close personal ties to networks. In the case of 
transnational mobilizations in Paris, all of the studied networks relied on 
Facebook as a mobilization tool, whether as a tool to keep people informed 
about demonstrations, attract new members, or discuss political issues in 
specific, more closed subgroups created for this matter. Especially for small 
grassroots groups with little financial and organizational resources, Facebook 
was extremely useful to mobilize and organize support.  
In general, we can say that the tendency of less female participation in 
cyberspace witnessed in the Middle East is also reproduced in social media 
profiles of Egyptian political networks in Paris. Nevertheless, the following 
analysis of Facebook networks shows that during the last three years, women 
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clusters and female friendship networks have appeared in social media. 
Women participate heavily; however, they are rarely the most active 
discussion leaders.  
Figure 1: Visualization of the friendship network of the Facebook group 
aṣ-Ṣafḥa ar-Rasmiyya li-Jamʿiyyat Shabāb 25 Yanāyir bi-Bārīs. 
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The group “The official page of the association of the youth of January 25 
in Paris” had 967 members at the time of writing and is mainly divided into 
two main friendship circles (above and below) with one central member 
connecting these two groups. 220 out of the 967 members are women (blue), 
thus representing roughly a quarter (22,54 %) of users. However, the best 
connected and most active members of the group (size of nodes) are male 
(green). The size of the node corresponds to the degree of connectedness 
within the network. Most of the friendship network is male dominated except 
for a small, female network within one of the two big friendship networks. 
Female members are less active and not as well connected.  
Figure 2: Visualization of the friendship network of the Facebook group 
Shabāb 25 Yanāyir fī Faransā 
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“Youth of 25 January in France” is an association which developed 
out of the original organization “Youth of 25 January Paris”. At the time of 
writing, the group had 1,026 members and was built up by three main 
friendship networks (of which one is much better interconnected than the 
other two). 247 of the 1026 users were female, representing 24.1% of all users. 
As in the first example, the whole network is mainly male dominated (green) 
and the best connected members are male. However, smaller female networks 
can also be witnessed.  
Figure 3: Visualization of the Facebook group Harakat 6 Abrīl Faransā. 
The group “The Movement of April 6 France” is much smaller than the 
first two examples with 234 members at the time of writing. The main 
network is built by two friendship circles. Out of its 234 members, 50 are 
female, corresponding to 21, 37% of all users. Even if the majority of the best 
connected users are male (green), in this network we can see one very active 
and well connected female member (blue).  
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Figure 4: Visualization of the Facebook page at-Tahāluf al-Watanī li-Dacm ash-
Sharciyya bi-Faransā 
The Facebook page “The National Alliance to Support Legitimacy 
France” was used at the time of writing by 1,014 users. It is mainly formed by 
one big community that is strongly interlinked. 222 of its users are female, 
corresponding to 21,89%. As in the other examples, the most active and best-
connected commentators are male (green), dominated by the administrator 
of the page. Nevertheless, two bigger female communities are visualized in 
the map and several well-connected female users are present in the networks 
competing in their level of activism with male users. 
In summary, women’s participation in these virtual spaces can be viewed 
as less numerous and less visible compared to their male counterparts. The 
participation of women lays around 20-25%.  
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CHALLENGES FOR TRANSNATIONAL FEMALE ACTIVISTS:  
MARGINALISATION AND FRAGMENTATION  
As I have shown above, women are less numerous and less visible in 
transnational mobilizations in Paris trying to influence (post-)revolution in 
Egypt. The important question thus remains: Why is this the case? 
Most of the major theories of incorporation devote almost no attention 
to gender while existing studies on transnational migrant politics tend to 
portray an image of very little participation, or none at all, by women.25 For 
instance, studies of Latino migrant populations in the US suggest that men 
usually dominate political activities involving the country of origin, especially 
the more institutionalized ones, while women tend to participate less and 
focus more on conditions in the receiving nation (Goldring 2011; Guarnizo, 
Portes & Haller 2003; Itzigsohn & Giourguli-Saudeco 2005; Jones-Correa 
1998). 
In the following pages, I show how three factors influence women’s 
participation in Egyptian transnational politics in Paris: the gendered 
character of Egyptian migration to France itself; inner fragmentation and 
politicization among women, and thirdly; their own definition of politics.  
A male dominated migration 
The gendered character of Egyptian migration to France and patriarchal 
structures characterizing Egyptian transnational social fields in Paris play an 
essential role in the marginalization of women within these political 
networks.  
Egyptians started to become active emigrants in the early sixties. 26 
Historically, Egypt was a land of immigrants, not emigrants. However today, 
emigration has become an omnipresent social phenomenon discussed in 
popular culture, such as Iqrā il-khabar (Read the news) by Masār Igbārī, films 
(Black Honey or ʿAsal Iswid by Khālid Marʿī) and literature, such as Safīnat 
Nūḥ by Khālid al-Khamīsī. Almost every Egyptian family nowadays has a 
member of its extended family living abroad. Over the last four decades, two 
distinct destination regions have emerged for Egyptian migrants: Arab Gulf 
countries and the industrialized countries of the West. Egyptian emigrants 
have been moving to the countries of the Arab Gulf mainly on the basis of 
temporary work contracts, normally without the prospect of permanent stay 
or right to citizenship privileges. However, since the 1960s, growing numbers 
have been also migrating to Europe, North America and Australia with the 
intention of staying permanently in these destination countries.27  
Two waves of Egyptian migration to France can be distinguished. From 
the Suez Crisis in 1956 onwards, a rather small stream of Egyptians left Egypt 
in the direction of France. The majority of these migrants were either middle 
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or upper class Egyptians who left Egypt because of Nasser’s nationalization 
programs at the beginning of the 1960s, followed by political opponents, 
Egyptian Jews and a - mostly Coptic - educational elite who migrated to 
France to continue their academic education.28 Today, this first migration 
stream has formed a second generation, but represents only about 10% of the 
total Egyptian community in France.29 Slowly, with the economic problems 
emerging in Egypt in the beginning of the 1970s the migration profile has 
changed considerably. The second – and much more significant - migration 
to Paris (and France) started in the second half of the 1970s30 and intensified 
in the 1980s when temporary labor migration to the Arab oil-producing 
countries declined as a result of economic and political developments in the 
Middle East. 31  Reem Saad’s fieldwork on migration networks among 
Egyptian workers in Paris shows that new migration patterns have been set 
up, characterized by close networks and particular emigration regions in 
Egypt, stemming mostly from a limited number of villages and towns in the 
central Nile Delta, such as Mīt Badr Ḥalāwa in particular, but also Mīt Ḥabīb, 
Maḥallat Ziyād and Banā Abū Ṣīr.32 
Unlike the first wave of migration, this type of migration was often 
characterized as male labor migration. European countries have made legal 
migration more and more difficult in the last years. Because of that, France is 
experiencing a higher level of illegal migration, including Egyptian migrants. 
Most Egyptian labor migrants find employment in construction, the weekly 
food markets and restaurants through close-knit networks. The majority of 
these migrants are single men or have left their families back in Egypt and 
often live in all-male accommodations.33 Men thus often outnumber women 
in the political networks described above, as the following statement 
illustrates:   
And here… it’s a problem of the type of migration, it’s 
labor migration and there are more men, it’s not because 
women stay in their homes, it’s because these men have 
no women (laughs). We are not many, but we are very 
active. It is just because we are in France. I don’t know 
how it is in other countries where there are more women 
than men, but here it is really because of the type of 
migration.  
Inner fragmentation and politicization: Different versions of femininity and 
activism 
Secondly, - as Stephan has shown - in the diaspora, fragmentation and 
politicization among women constitute a second challenge to women’s 
activism.34 Johansson-Nogués has argued that in social contexts 
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characterized by social upheaval concepts of gender and sexuality tend to 
become destabilized. She uses Connell’s gender binary model (1987) of 
“hegemonic masculinity” (a privileged or culturally dominant type of 
masculinity) and a varied set of subordinated masculinities and femininities, 
to argue that when the former authoritarian regime in Egypt fell, the 
hegemonic masculinity that the regime had portrayed and reproduced, was 
toppled. 35 In the following political vacuum, different competing groups 
emerged offering each their own particular version of masculinities and 
femininities.   
Transnational female activists I interviewed in Paris were internally 
fragmented in the question which place religion and Islam should play in 
their activism and its role in society. Shahnaz Khan’s article on Muslim 
women in Canada has described women’s translations and negotiations of 
Islam in minority diasporic communities in the First Wolds and has shown 
that in a diasporic setting the “grounding as a muslim [sic] is significantly 
more fragile than the women’s “home” countries. 36 She emphasizes that “the 
Muslim community” is often assumed to be a single, monolithic religious 
community with no real understanding of progressive engagement with 
religion or any appreciation of feminist positions among Muslim women.37
The interviews I lead with activist women in Paris, their perceptions and 
negotiations of Islam and modernity, demonstrated on the one hand a large 
spectrum of opinions on femininity and their vision of activism as a woman 
and mirrored the fragmented public debate on Muslim (and Arab) women in 
the Middle East. Secondly, I argue that in a diasporic context today, the 
debate on Muslim women has become particularly sensitive and difficult. 
Some Arab-American scholars, like Naber (2011) have reported from their 
personal experiences about the politicization and fragmentation they face as 
Arab women activists in the US,38  while others even speak about the 
politicization of Arab-American feminists who transplant political cleavages 
from the Arab world to the United States.39  
It is very difficult to label the visions and negotiations of the women I 
interviewed and I somewhat prefer to restrain from doing so. Also, Evelyn 
Shakir’s book Bint Arab (1997) about Arab women immigrants in the US 
shows how women’s identity negotiations defy essentialzed notions of “Arab” 
and/or “Muslim” identity. 40 What can be said is that women I interviewed 
located themselves somewhere between two oppositional poles for gender 
justice present in the Arab world today: Riham Bahi has distinguished 
between two oppositional discourses mobilized for gender justice in the Arab 
World today, a “secular feminism” and an “Islamic/Islamist feminism” while 
she employs the terms Islamic/Islamist interchangeably and broadly to mean 
anything pertaining to Islam.41 
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Arab feminism was born during the decline of the Ottoman Empire and 
the emergence of Arab nationalism, in a highly complex context and  – as 
Nawar al-Hassan Golley has put it – “out of the struggle between the dying, 
traditional, religious, feudal Ottoman way of life and the rising, modern, 
secular, capitalist European ways of life.”42 First 19th century reformers, such 
as Ahmad Fares el-Shidyak, Rifaa Rari al-Tahtawi, and Muhammad Abdu, 
emphasized especially the right to education for women. In literature on 
feminism in the Muslim (and Arab) World, scholars have often made a 
distinction between Muslim and Islamist feminism. Muslim feminism, 
incarnated by women such as Amina Wadud or Fatima Mernissi, affirms the 
equality of men and women under Islam by challenging and refuting 
traditional patriarchal readings of the Qur’an and the Hadith.43 The rise of 
Islamic women’s movements throughout the Arab world has further 
challenged secular assumptions of feminism by focusing primarily on 
progressive readings of Islamic texts to argue for a more egalitarian Islamic 
tradition than enhances women’s rights. Islamism emerged during the anti-
colonial struggle of the Arab World during the early-to-mid twentieth 
century and carries until today strong anti-Western sentiments and an 
emphasis on the struggle against Western influences. Islamist feminists such 
as the Egyptian Zaynab al-Ghazali or the Moroccan Nadine Yassine 
emphasize the distinction to Western feminism and see Western feminism as 
an ideological vehicle for the differentiation of the public and private spheres, 
seeking to restrict God exclusively to the latter, as the following interview 
with Nadine Yassine shows:   
Mine is not the feminism of Simone de Beauvoir, the 
Western style feminism… The West got rid of the idea of 
God, at least in the public sphere. It endeavors are purely 
materialistic. They thus automatically excluded any idea 
of spirituality to return to God. My struggle, on the other 
hand, is essentially spiritual, not a struggle between men 
and women for material entitlements.44 
Rather than conceiving feminism as a single or coherent doctrine, I 
understand it as a “highly charged field of competing narratives about the 
nature and consequences of gender identities”. It is somewhat difficult to 
classify the women activists I interviewed in the above mentioned categories, 
but I what I observed is that these discourses played an important role in 
their activism and self-understanding as women, even if they did not label 
themselves as neither secular, nor Muslim or Islamist feminist. Their visions 
especially shed light on their multiple approaches to Islam and the question 
which role Islam should play in society. One main cleavage was the question 
of religion in the public space: While some women rejected religion in the 
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public sphere, other emphasized Islam’s public role, the public role of 
Muslim women in this context, and in general, Islam as an essential part of 
identity. What I witnessed in Paris is that for groups like The National 
Alliance to Support Legitimacy France – and their subgroup Women Against 
the Coup mobilizing for the return of Morsy after 30 June 2013 – Islam and 
religiosity are ever present and important parts of their activism: 
For me, it is a lot about the Palestinian question, but at the 
same time this struggle makes us also sensitive to everything 
that is around us, to our condition of Muslim militants, of the 
youth also. It is all that which we try to translate into a militant 
fight. (…) What I learn from Egyptians, from all Arabs is that 
they will make their way without the so-called free people of 
the world. (...) Today, values are over there, they are not here 
anymore. You can see that. Last Saturday during the 
demonstration, there were people who passed and who said 
“again the Islamists, again the Arabs”. (...). Here in the 
Occident, people are less attached to values, it is over there 
where things are decided. It’s them who carry the values... 
that’s at least what I think. Honestly, I do not worry about 
people there; I worry more about people here.  
On the other end of the spectrum, religiosity is somewhat absent in the 
narration of liberal activists who identify with secular feminism: 
Mosques… Hmmm, I do not know them, but they have been 
so destructive that I do not have confidence in them. I prefer 
that they remain outside of everything. (...) For me… I like my 
religion, I am Muslim, I assert that I am Muslim, but I am 
outraged that they use this religion to send us back to the 
Middle Ages. Here, I do not agree. I do not go to mosques.  
The liberal activist and Kifaya supporter Shahinaz describes her ideological 
differences with female Islamist activists in Egypt as follows:  
I participated with the Islamists in…. things for Palestine. It’s 
funny, they do things for Palestine all the time, not for Egypt. I 
have to say that. But there were things I believed in, so I 
participated with them. It was funny, I was the only unveiled 
woman who participated in a demonstration with the Islamists 
and who walked in front, with the guys. My friends at 
university laughed at me all the time (…). But the Islamist 
girls, they thought that I was brilliant, they tried to convince 
me to ally with them during a whole year. They thought that I 
was great, but that I committed sins because I went out with 
boys. And because I said slogans that you shouldn’t say. And 
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because the voice of a woman is cawra [intimate part of her 
body]. They tried really hard (laughs). 
Marginalized by definition: A broader notion of politics and political 
participation 
Thirdly, I argue that women are less visible because female activists in 
their majority have a broader notion of political participation and do not 
necessarily define themselves as “political activists”. Michelle Kondo’s 
research on gender and political participation reveals that activists challenge 
the traditional notions of political motivations and recognized a broader 
range of motivations for political participation among women. 45  The 
personal often acted as a starting point for the political for her interviewees, 
thus blurring the traditional boundary of public and private often postulated 
in political participation.46 Numerous studies have shown that immigrant 
women are providing community organizing leadership within receiving 
countries. 47  Thus, Kondo argues that a broader notion of political 
incorporation including informal political activity is necessary to understand 
women’s political activism thoroughly. 48  Consequently, when informal 
political activity is included, levels of political participation among women 
increased significantly. This fact was also reflected in interviews I conducted 
with female activists in Paris when I asked them about why they participate 
politically and if they perceived themselves as political human beings.  
Most respondents mentioned very personal reasons for their political 
activism, such as wanting to support family members who are active in a 
political group or discrimination they experienced or witnessed in Egypt. 
Most interviewees emphasized their wish to create a more equal and just 
society as the main reason for their political involvement. They heavily 
emphasized the social character of their actions, and somewhat downplayed 
their political character. In the logical conclusion of that argument, they did 
not necessarily define themselves as political activists, even if by definition 
they are. The following statement illustrates this tendency very well:   
No, it’s only events which... I am a person who has moral and social 
principles. I was never a person who was interested in politics as such 
(...). Above all, I have no political ambition whatsoever. That’s the 
difference. I want to make my voice heard for a humanitarian goal. 
Nawar al-Hassan Golley has argued that the basic divide by social 
scientists into a “public” and “private” sphere does not capture the social 
reality of Arab women and the multiplicity of roles that they play in their 
societies.  She argues that in Arab countries – where the family performs 
obvious political, economic and cultural functions – there is no sense in 
drawing a hard line between the “public” and the ”private” sphere because 
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women often affect public life heavily through family structures. She argues 
that roles Arab women play might seem to have only social dimensions at 
first, but they can also greatly affect male politics.49 
CONCLUSION 
This paper sheds light on the ways in which Egyptian women engaged in 
transnational mobilizations in Paris, how they experienced and lived these 
moments as they took part in their struggle. The revolutionary process in 
Egypt in 2011 lead to a massive politicization of Egyptians who had been 
disillusioned by politics for a long time. The revolution was lived by many 
Egyptians – both in Egypt and its diasporic communities – as a deeply 
collective experience and altered their relationships to Egyptian politics and 
society. Women were part of the political struggle and participated on a 
significant scale in the public sphere and in the cyberspace during the 
uprisings.  
Through a discussion on transnational political networks in Paris and the 
politicization of Egyptian social fields during the revolutionary processes in 
Egypt, I showed how political events in Egypt can, and have affected life 
among members of the Egyptian diaspora. The revolutionary upheavals 
between 2011 and 2013 were a trigger for the emergence of a new sense of 
collectivity that included women. Nevertheless, transnational mobilizations 
in Paris were male dominated. Women participated in demonstrations, 
political networks and cyberspace to a significant extent, but were less visible 
and less numerous than men. Despite their smaller numbers these women 
activists were typically neither marginalized nor poorly educated immigrants, 
but were educationally, socially and economically privileged.  
Women in a diasporic context face several obstacles in their 
transnational political participation. These derive from various things such as 
the characteristics of the respective migration itself, inner fragmentation 
among women, but also the activists’ own understandings of political 
participation. In Paris, mobilizations were, and continue to be, heavily 
influenced by the predominantly male character of Egyptian migration to 
France and the patriarchal migration networks that engender and facilitate it. 
Recent Egyptian migration to France is predominantly male, and often 
irregular, labor migration. Already marginalized by their minimal numbers, 
women are further fragmented by their vision of activism and femininity 
dividing them in their interpretation of the role religion should play in their 
activism. Furthermore, women often see their activism in more social terms 
than political, emphasizing humanitarian and global justice rather than their 
political objectives.  
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Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués has explained women’s lack of influence 
over the direction of the current state-building projects and the current 
insecurities in Egypt by a discussion of discursive femininities and 
masculinities in Egypt: She argues that in 2011, with the fall of the regime of 
Moubarak, the hegemonic masculinity of the former authoritarian regime 
was toppled. With the rise of the Islamist party, a counter-masculinity 
emerged, engaged in discursively marking its difference from the prior 
hegemonic masculinity pictured as “alien” and “imported from the West”. In 
this context, women whose participation was crucial for the delegitimisation 
of the regimes and their subsequent fall, were subsequently being othered by 
their previous co-revolutionaries as though they were a mere straightforward 
extension of the former regime. Johansson-Nogués explains that this has lead 
to a decided leadership vacuum in women’s social movements developments 
Tunisia, Egypt & Libya.50 Only future developments in the region will show 
how women’s participation in Egyptian politics will turn out to be and how 
visions of femininity will shape their actions, especially after the elections in 
May 2014.  
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